Brokers, Pontiac work to overcome Silverdome's losing record | MLive.com
Published: Thursday, May 24, 2007, 8:38 AM Updated: Thursday, May 24, 2007, 10:47 AM
"...But bringing a buyer to the table may be the easiest part of trying to sell the former home of the Detroit Lions. The seller, the City of Pontiac, is notorious for slowing, stalling or killing deals. Just two years ago - before the property was formally transferred from a stadium authority to the city - Etkin Equities and Schostak Brothers/Danou Enterprises made $20 million offers, but the developers walked away as city leaders squabbled."
Nonetheless, the brokers are optimistic - and ready to go.
"We're taking all offers to the city. Our feeling is they are open to anything," says Myrna Burroughs of CB Richard Ellis. "Anything but a casino."
More potential than Lions?
CB Richard Ellis has sent fliers to some 11,000 potential land buyers, Burroughs says, and is expecting city approval soon for its marketing website and the final version of the request for proposals.
Thursday, May 24, 2007
Sunday, January 15, 2006
Are GM and Ford Playing High-Stakes Poker Disguised as
Delphi and Visteon?
By Fred Leeb
Have GM and Ford developed a grand strategy designed to
flush out their high union cost structures so they can be competitive again in North America?
Are GM and Ford, disguised as Delphi
and Visteon, sitting at the poker table with the unions to accomplish
this? Or, are many pundits correct who see
Delphi and Visteon merely as independent
companies suffering from the continuing pressures of the extremely competitive
automotive industry?
The purpose of this article is to begin to provide an
alternate view on the following issues:
1. Do
GM and Ford want to resolve their own labor cost issues by working them out
first at Delphi and Visteon?
2. Do
GM and Ford want to protect their own images as caring members of the community
from the screaming and finger-pointing they expect to occur prior to a labor settlement
with the unions (by keeping the media spotlights at Delphi and Visteon)?
3. Will
manipulating Delphi and Visteon to do their
bidding enable GM and Ford to protect their own cash hordes and other assets
from the union negotiators?
4. Are
GM and Ford using Delphi and Visteon to bring
employee costs to a crisis now so that they can replicate the newly competitive
cost structures in their own companies before it is too late?
In other words, is this really a
game of high-stakes poker where GM and Ford are sitting at the table dressed up
as Delphi and Visteon betting with the
stockholders money of their “independent” suppliers rather than their own?
The facts indicate that both GM and Ford (at roughly the
same time in the 1990’s) saw that they were losing market share in North America and that their labor costs (current wages,
benefits, pensions and retiree health care) were significantly higher than
their competitors. In addition, the UAW
had conducted work stoppages in June/July 1998 in Flint that had an unfavorable after-tax
impact on GM of about $2.0 billion. In
the 1990’s, GM and Ford’s own parts operations were clearly the most obvious
targets for both cost-cutting and for out-sourcing to other low-cost
manufacturers. In addition, these parts
operations were perfect candidates for a “grand strategy” because they had
large numbers of union employees.
It is quite possible that GM and Ford’s turnaround experts not
only identified the critical need for labor cost reductions but they also
developed a process as to how it could be accomplished. They could have realized that they needed a
dramatic and fundamental change in their cost structure to again approach
future profitability. It is likely that
they knew that the more fundamental the change, the greater is the opportunity
for improvement. With fundamental
change, however, comes great risk. They could
well have thought that they could accomplish almost as much (and insulate
themselves from most of the risk) by taking bold action to initiate and manage
the process elsewhere first (Delphi and Visteon), the grand strategy.
By using Delphi and
Visteon, GM and Ford also could develop a clear-cut economic case where there
would be only one solution—cutting union costs dramatically. They would not want to negotiate with the
union using their own complex financial situations to justify their
maneuvers. GM and Ford, in this manner,
also could protect their huge cash hordes.
As of September 30,
2005, GM had cash and short term investments of $35.1 billion and
Ford had $36.8 billion.
GM and Ford established separate corporate entities (Delphi and Visteon) by spin-offs of these companies to
their stockholders. Delphi
was spun off from GM in 1999; Visteon was spun off from Ford in 2000. GM and Ford, thereby, not only could
accomplish the goals discussed above but also immediately became free to buy
parts from other lower cost global suppliers and reduce their own exposure to
the union’s counterattacks. For example,
a “joint Ford-Visteon competitive pricing study intended to make Visteon’s
prices competitive with third party competitors” enabled Ford to cut by 5% the
prices it paid to Visteon for almost all parts just prior to Visteon’s spin
off.
Because of the spin-offs, however, GM and Ford could no
longer control the stock of either Delphi or
Visteon. But GM and Ford still had their own former executives running these
new companies. For example, at December 31, 2000, five of
the top seven Visteon executives were previously top Ford executives. In addition, GM and Ford still could control Delphi and Visteon’s profitability through their
purchasing power. This is because the majority
of the parts produced by Delphi and Visteon
are sold to GM and Ford. For example, GM’s
Supply Agreement with Delphi provided that GM
has the right to move its business with Delphi
to other suppliers in the event that Delphi is
not competitive.
Therefore, by working through the process using Delphi and Visteon, GM and Ford could distance themselves
and still bring labor cost issues to a boil.
The impact on Delphi and Visteon has
been severe. Since mid-2001, Delphi’s stock price has dropped by over 90% and
Visteon’s has dropped by about 50%. Delphi has lost about $3.4 billion since it was spun off
from GM in 1999 through June 2005. Delphi also filed for bankruptcy on October 8, 2005. From October 8, 2005 to November 30, 2005, Delphi
lost $127 million and incurred $23 million in professional fees. Visteon has lost about $4.1 billion since it
was spun off from Ford in 2000 through September 2005. These losses have impacted Delphi
and Visteon’s shareholders, not GM and Ford.
In fact, a case probably could be made that GM and Ford benefited from Delphi and Visteon’s poor financial results. GM and Ford paid lower prices and reduced the
volume of business that they previously had with Delphi
and Visteon, as they increased their sourcing to other cheaper global
suppliers. Both Delphi
and Visteon had been profitable prior to the spin-offs.
In the meantime, GM and Ford have continued to say that they
are good negotiating partners with their unions. GM and Ford also have agreed to maintain many
of the benefits for employees transferred to Delphi
and Visteon. If this is put into
perspective, however, these costs could be a very small price to pay. If Delphi and Visteon reach an agreement with
their unions and set a precedent of dramatically lower employee costs, there
will be a working model for both GM and Ford to copy in the future (with much
larger numbers of union employees and much greater potential savings). Delphi
worldwide employment at December
31, 1998 was approximately 198,000 (33,000 salaried and 165,000
hourly), 33% of GM’s total worldwide employment. In 2005, Delphi
claimed that it paid its workers about $65/hour including benefits, more than
double the amount paid by the competition.
Delphi has taken advantage of its
position in bankruptcy to act very aggressively. For example, Delphi
proposed cutting hourly base wages from $27 to $12.50 (the original demand was
$9.50) but is now seeking a negotiated settlement, with GM’s assistance.
Is there a grand strategy to dramatically reduce union costs
not only for Delphi and Visteon but more
importantly, for GM and Ford too? Have
GM and Ford set processes in place causing Delphi
and Visteon to do their bidding? Did GM
and Ford turn the screws on Delphi and Visteon
through tough purchasing tactics to force the issue because they knew they
couldn’t wait any longer? Did GM and
Ford have to precipitate crises with Delphi
and Visteon now so that they could move on to breaking the union at their own
companies before it is too late?
We are not sure yet of the answers to these and many other questions. We can only analyze the facts and speculate
on managements’ strategies. We will wait
and see how the hands play out.
Highlights of the events leading up to today’s poker game:
GM/Delphi
- GM reported that Delphi’s net income had dropped from a profit of $853 million in 1996 to a loss of $93 million in 1998 (the year before the spin-off).
- The UAW conducted work stoppages in June/July 1998 in Flint that had an unfavorable after-tax impact on GM of about $2.0 billion.
- GM’s “competitiveness studies” caused GM to record pre-tax charges against income for Delphi of $310 million in 1998 and $1.4 billion in 1997. GM’s Supply Agreement with Delphi provided that GM has the right to move its business with Delphi to other suppliers in the event that Delphi is not competitive.
- Delphi worldwide employment at December 31, 1998 was approximately 198,000 (33,000 salaried and 165,000 hourly), 33% of GM’s total worldwide employment. About 93% of the hourly employees were represented by unions (43,000 of these were in the US and represented by the UAW).
- Delphi management personnel were predominantly long-term GM executives.
- Delphi (conveniently for GM) embraced the strategy of reducing its reliance on GM business because, now that it was independent, it must have a more diverse customer portfolio. GM was pleased to source parts from other suppliers.
Ford/Visteon
- In 1998, Visteon was almost totally reliant on Ford since 88% of Visteon revenue came from Ford; 81% of Visteon’s business was in North America.
- A “joint Ford-Visteon competitive pricing study intended to make Visteon’s prices competitive with third party competitors” caused Ford to cut by 5% the prices it paid to Visteon for almost all parts just prior to Visteon’s spin off. In 2000, Visteon net income fell to $270 million (partially due to this pricing adjustment).
- This price decrease in 2000 dramatically changed the Ford/Visteon relationship. Previously, in 1999, Visteon’s net income had increased to $735 million from $511 million in 1997. Visteon estimated that, had the 5% price reduction effective January 1, 2000 been in effect for 1999, sales [and presumably profits] in 1999 would have decreased by $690 million.
- Ford retained liability for all product liability, warranty or recall claims that involve parts made or sold by Ford for 1996 or earlier model year Ford vehicles. Visteon became responsible for these types of claims relating to 1997 or later model year Ford vehicles.
- At December 31, 2000, Visteon had approximately 18,000 salaried and 64,000 hourly workers. Of the hourly workforce, approximately 24,000 were Ford employees in the US covered under the Ford UAW Master Agreement. At December 31, 1999 (prior to the spin off of Visteon), Ford had a total of 364,550 employees.
- At December 31, 2000, five of the top seven Visteon executives were previously top Ford executives.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
In the past 30 years, I have learned a number of basic lessons while working with many large and small, successful and troubled organizations. I believe these lessons often can make the fundamental difference between business success and failure. Please read the following and pass it along to others who may find it helpful. |
How Do You Cut Costs After You Have Cut to the Bone? The Top 30 Ways to Reduce Expense
By Fred Leeb
The first step is to recognize that further significant cost cuts demand strategic thinking, teamwork, and a sound business plan, the same process required for a growth plan. Otherwise, further cuts will weaken the organization and are very likely to lead to just more cost cutting later on. Cost cuts should be a means of strengthening the organization for the future, not just buying time. An experienced consultant can provide the valuable perspectives to help make prudent decisions, the manpower to get the job done with a sense of urgency at a critical juncture, the new ideas and creativity from understanding how many other organizations have faced similar issues and the objectivity needed to counter entrenched vested interests. In the list below, the most successful cost reduction methods are listed first and the least preferred (but the most often used methods) are listed last:
Least Preferred Cost Reduction Methods
As stated previously, cost cuts should be a means of strengthening the company for the future. An experienced consultant can provide:
|
Thursday, September 15, 2005
Do You Really Want to Do Everything Yourself
By Fred Leeb
As the head of the organization, you have proven the
capability to solve whatever problem comes up.
You have risen up through the ranks by making your boss look good, by
getting the most out of your teammates and by always looking for new ideas. On your way up, you learned a lot from others
because you recognized they had good ideas of their own and lots of experience for
you to draw upon. You even complained
once in a while about how you did all the work while your boss just had to sit
back and watch you grow. In fact, your
only wish was for your boss to stay out of your way.
Now that you are in charge, why does everything seem
different?
- Why are you working more hours than any of your employees?
- Why must you try to solve everyone’s problems for them?
- Why are you the only one to understand the urgency of the situation?
- Why are you the only one living up to the commitments you have made?
- Why must you be everywhere at once?
- Why must you rely only on yourself to solve difficult problems?
- Why is the entire burden of success on your shoulders?
The answer is that you have trained your employees to rely
on you. They are watching you very
carefully and are internalizing your actions.
If you don’t care about the team, they won’t care about the team. If you don’t listen to your advisors, they
won’t listen to their supervisors. If
they think that you only want to solve a problem your way, they won’t even try
to do it differently and will wait for you to step in and save the day. Even worse, many employees may actually be
behaving counterproductively. They may
be vocally resentful or pulling against each other. Since you are the leader, nobody but you can
change the personality of the organization that you have established. If you allow this behavior to go unchecked it
will result in tremendous costs to your organization and much greater risks in
the future.
In addition, if you are taking on the most difficult parts
of your employees’ jobs, you might as well also cut the number of your
employees and/or reduce their pay. If
you do that, however, you should expect that your profitability will decline. You know that if you really could do their
jobs yourself you wouldn’t have hired them in the first place.
Instead, shouldn’t you encourage them to suggest new ideas,
take on new commitments, and make their own ideas work so they can then gain the
confidence they need to take on even more responsibility? Won’t your organization be much stronger when
everyone is contributing and you are sharing the burden with them rather than
keeping it all on your own shoulders? Your
employees are relying on you to help them achieve their greatest potential, not
to do their job.
You may be saying, “OK, OK, I know that but it’s much easier
said than done.” That’s exactly
right. That’s why you, as head of the organization,
should be asking, “What will be my ‘bang for the buck’ and who should I rely
on to help me achieve success?” You
are actually the most important link in the chain for the very reason that you
are the head of the organization.
Without your effective leadership, it is almost impossible for your
employees to make the organization successful.
In fact, the worst case scenario occurs when the president is the
organization’s biggest enemy, he/she doesn’t even realize it, and there is no other
catalyst for change. With your
effective leadership, however, your organization can achieve greatness.
But who can you rely on for new ideas and to prevent
stagnation? Fortunately, you already
have invested in a circle of professionals—your banker, attorney, accountant
and business consultant--who are now ready and able to give you tremendous
value at relatively low cost. This
is because they already have worked on your transactions, business issues and
financials. Don’t let this knowledge go
to waste. They already know:
·
The additional perspectives you need to both
stimulate change and make prudent decisions
·
The resources you have available and your
operating constraints
·
What many other organizations have done to be
successful
·
How to avoid the many pitfalls experienced by
others
·
The personalities of your leaders and the
history of your organization
The best leaders are those
constantly looking for good ideas everywhere and learning from others, just
like you did when you were going up the ranks.
The Bottom Line
A well-functioning team almost always beats the individual player. The team, however, is almost totally dependent
on its leader. The best leaders stay
the best by utilizing their own team of professionals, consisting of their
banker, attorney, accountant and business consultant, as tools to help them be
successful. Often, these
professionals can be used very effectively at relatively low cost because they
already know about the unique aspects of your business. Their knowledge is from working through past
transactions, accounting reviews and business analyses. Your organization is depending on you to
utilize these valuable assets (that you already have paid for) to make the team
successful. The return will be tremendous.
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